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ABSTRACT 
Alaska’s prisons are full, but crime has not come to a standstill.  The 
costs of incarceration continue to rise and so do the number of 
inmates. The State has found itself in the midst of an urgent 
dilemma—it must control the mounting costs of criminal justice yet 
ensure public safety. It must also ensure that criminals receive just 
punishment. And since packing prisons has proved an inadequate 
solution, it is time to search for effective alternatives. This Note 
proposes increasing the use of electronic monitoring as an alternative 
to incarceration. The current electronic monitoring program in 
Alaska has addressed budget concerns but has not met crime 
reduction goals. Thus, the Note proposes a “hybrid” electronic 
monitoring program—one that combines the current electronic 
monitoring program with other alternatives to incarceration, 
including therapeutic justice and halfway housing.  This “hybrid” 
should maximize resources and minimize costs, helping to correct the 




With one of the fastest-growing prison populations in the United 
States, Alaska faces an urgent criminal justice dilemma of how to control 
costs while maintaining public safety.1 Alaska spends $44,000 per 
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 1. STEPHANIE MARTIN AND STEVE COLT, INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
RESEARCH, UNIVERSITY OF ALASKA ANCHORAGE, RESEARCH SUMMARY NO. 71, THE 
COST OF CRIME: COULD THE STATE REDUCE FUTURE CRIME AND SAVE MONEY BY 
EXPANDING EDUCATION AND TREATMENT PROGRAMS? 1 (2009) [hereinafter THE 
ALLADINA_FINAL_2 5/6/2011  2:27:14 PM 
126 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [28:1 
inmate per year, and prisons are at full capacity.2 In addition to curbing 
the rising costs of incarceration and the number of inmates, the state 
must simultaneously ensure public safety and effective use of tax 
dollars.3 And, of course, offenders must receive punishments that 
appear just and serve retributive, deterrent, and rehabilitative or 
reintegrative goals.4 Because increasing the prison population has failed 
to thwart the mounting crisis,5 the use of alternatives to incarceration 
has become imperative. One such alternative is electronic monitoring. 
The Electronic Monitoring (EM) program in Alaska, governed by 
sections 33.30.061(c) and 33.30.065 of the Alaska Statutes,6 “allows 
inmates who meet certain requirements to serve time at home.”7 Eligible 
offenders apply to one of five Electronic Monitoring Offices, located in 
Anchorage, Fairbanks, Kenai, Ketchikan, and Sitka.8 If approved, an 
offender pays a twelve or fourteen dollar fee per day plus ten dollars for 
a urinalysis test.9 She may then serve her sentence from home, in 
accordance with specific terms and conditions.10 Outwardly, Alaska’s 
EM program, like several others across the country, appears to provide a 
cost-effective and viable alternative to incarceration.11 However, 
successful use of EM has not yet been fully realized in the state.12 This is 
 
COST OF CRIME], available at http://www.iser.uaa.alaska.edu/Publications/ 
researchsumm/RS_71.pdf. 
 2. Id. at 2. The $44,000 per inmate per year figure is actually less than its 
1980s counterpart. Id. Martin and Colt contend that even so, the figure is still 
high. Id. But cf. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 
11 (2003), available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t18.pdf 
(documenting state and local justice system per capita expenditures and 
specifically documenting Alaska’s high per capita expenditures on corrections as 
$279.09—second only to those for the District of Columbia). 
 3. THE COST OF CRIME, supra note 1, at 1. 
 4. See generally Richard S. Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67 
(2005) (discussing the limitations of and conflicts between various contemporary 
sentencing rationales). 
 5. THE COST OF CRIME, supra note 1, at 1. 
 6. ALASKA STAT. § 33.30.061(c) (2010); ALASKA STAT. § 33.30.065 (2010). 
 7. Electronic Monitoring, ALASKA DEP’T OF CORR., http:// 
www.correct.state.ak.us/corrections/institutions/anch/anchEM.jsf (last visited 
Feb. 20, 2011). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. See ALASKA DEP’T OF CORR., ELECTRONIC MONITORING TERMS AND 
CONDITIONS (2007), available at http://www.correct.state.ak.us/corrections 
/institutions/anch/docs/SW_Terms_and_Conditions.pdf. 
 11. See THE COST OF CRIME, supra note 1, at 3 fig.6 (demonstrating that the 
state saves about twenty-two times the amount it spends by using EM as an 
alternative to incarceration). 
 12. See id. (noting that, although significantly less expensive than other 
alternatives to jail and prison, EM has not been shown to reduce future crime in 
Alaska). 
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due to several factors, including the newness of the technology,13 but 
courts’ confusion with how to apply credit from time served while on 
EM to sentencing has been particularly problematic. The Alaska Court 
of Appeals’ holding in Matthew v. State14 is a telling example. 
In Matthew, the court applied its rule from an earlier case, Nygren v. 
State,15 holding that petitioner’s court-ordered condition of release—
EM—did not amount to “restrictions approximating those experienced 
by one who is incarcerated.”16 The court further held that a petitioner 
subjected to pretrial conditions of release that are the same as those 
experienced by a sentenced individual should not automatically receive 
credit for time served.17 Although the court affirmed the “restrictions 
approximating those experienced by one who is incarcerated”18 
standard set out in Nygren, the case as a whole demonstrates a 
continuing lack of clarity about the effective and efficient use of EM in 
the criminal context—especially with respect to its dissimilar use in the 
pretrial and sentencing contexts. Embedded in this uncertainty is the 
need to manage prisons and balance punitive goals with budget 
concerns. The current EM program in Alaska has addressed budget 
concerns, but has not met crime reduction goals.19 At the same time, 
prisons are still overcrowded.20 This Note attempts to put these various 
issues into perspective and proposes a possible solution that could 
 
 13. See DICK WHITFIELD, TACKLING THE TAG: THE ELECTRONIC MONITORING OF 
OFFENDERS 36–37 (1997) [hereinafter WHITFIELD, TACKLING THE TAG] (citing 
Ronald Corbett and Gary T. Marx, Critique: No Soul in the Machine; Technofallacies 
in the Electronic Monitoring Movement, 8 JUST. Q. 399–414 (1991)). 
 14. Matthew v. State, 152 P.3d 469, 473 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007) (holding that 
credit was not given when conditions during EM were not “approximate” to 
those in incarceration). 
 15. 658 P.2d 141, 146–47 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (holding that credit for time 
served while released on bail or probation is determined by the “extent to which 
a person released on bail or probation is subjected to restrictions approximating 
those experienced by one who is incarcerated”).  
 16. Matthew, 152 P.3d at 473 (quoting Nygren, 658 P.2d at 146). 
 17. See id. 
 18. Id. (quoting Nygren, 658 P.2d at 146). 
 19. See THE COST OF CRIME, supra  note 1, at 3. 
 20. See id. at 2 (supporting the claim that Alaska prisons are full by 
comparing the 1980 rate of incarceration—2 in 1000 Alaskans behind bars—to 
the current rate of 10 in 1000, and acknowledging that “the 1,500-bed prison 
scheduled to open in 2012 is projected to be full soon after it opens”); see also U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS (2003), tbl.6.30.2009, 
available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t6302009.pdf 
(documenting percent change in number of prisoners under Alaska’s 
jurisdiction, which increased 3.3 percent from 4173 prisoners in 2000 to 5167 in 
2007); id. at tbl.6.2, available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t62.pdf 
(documenting the total number of Alaska adults under correctional supervision 
in 2003 as 10,900, 41.7 percent of whom were incarcerated). 
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successfully incorporate EM into the Alaskan criminal justice system 
both efficiently and effectively. 
Part I discusses the nature of EM in the criminal justice system and 
focuses on the present use of it in the Alaskan correctional system. Part 
II analyzes the state of the law concerning EM in Alaska. Part III probes 
both the potential of and the controversy surrounding the use of EM as 
an alternative to incarceration through the lenses of efficiency and 
effectiveness. Part IV then proposes a practical approach to EM that 
merges its use with other alternatives to incarceration. 
I.  THE NATURE OF ELECTRONIC MONITORING IN THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 
A.  What Is Electronic Monitoring? 
1.  Electronic Monitoring in General 
EM is a tool that is often used in conjunction with house 
confinement or house arrest to monitor an offender’s whereabouts and 
restrict his movements.21 By using electronic devices that emit electronic 
signals, EM systems can track an offender’s location and ensure 
compliance with the requirements of sentencing or supervised release.22 
EM systems vary widely and include a range of options such as 
“home monitoring devices, wrist bracelets, ankle bracelets, field 
monitoring devices, alcohol testing devices, and voice verification 
systems.”23 In a typical EM program, offenders wear uniquely coded 
electronic transmitter devices.24 This uniquely coded device sends a 
signal to a home monitoring device located in offenders’ homes and 
communicates with a central computer (and monitoring specialists) 
located in a monitoring center via telephone line.25 Because offenders 
must follow a regimented schedule and because their uniquely coded 
 
 21. DORIS LAYTON MACKENZIE, WHAT WORKS IN CORRECTIONS 319 (2006). 
 22. Id. 
 23. NAT’L L. ENFORCEMENT & CORR. TECH. CTR., KEEPING TRACK OF 
ELECTRONIC MONITORING 2 (1999) [hereinafter NLECTC], available at 
http://www.justnet.org/Lists/JUSTNET%20Resources/Attachments/859/Elec
-Monit.pdf; see also Matthew DeMichele & Brian Payne, Using Technology to 
Monitor Offenders: A Community Corrections Perspective, CORRECTIONS TODAY, Aug. 
2009, at 35 (providing examples of EM devices that agencies are currently 
experimenting with, including kiosk reporting, secure remote alcohol detection, 
GPS, and voice verification). 
 24. NLECTC, supra note 23, at 2. 
 25. Id. 
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devices signal any deviations from that schedule, monitoring specialists 
are able to keep track of offenders’ activities at all times.26 
Electronic offender monitoring occurs either passively or actively.27 
Passive EM systems usually require an offender to speak to a case officer 
via telephone (e.g. voice verification system) or verify his presence by 
inserting an electronic transmitter, unique to him, into a home 
monitoring device.28 These systems may also require an offender to 
breathe into a home breathalyzer device to determine his sobriety.29 
Active EM systems, on the other hand, have the advantage of constantly 
monitoring an offender’s whereabouts and do not depend on the 
offender’s cooperation.30 
2. Economic, Practicability, and Eligibility Issues Surrounding the Use 
of Electronic Monitoring 
With either the passive or active EM model, certain economic, 
practicability, and eligibility issues arise. First, EM programs require 
participating offenders to have access to homes with telephone land 
lines.31 Since these are not available to all who may wish to participate, 
the requirement unfairly limits the pool of eligible offenders at the 
outset—discriminating against the poor and those who do not have 
homes or phones.32 Consequently, “[a] challenge that the rich get tagged 
and the poor get prison might well have some substance.”33 But at the 
same time, EM is viewed as more economical than incarceration 
precisely because most offenders subjected to EM programming must 
cover the costs of that sanction.34 
Second, the criminal justice process as a whole is not without an 
underlying profit motive.35 EM programs resulted from privatization 
 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See Margaret P. Spencer, Sentencing Drug Offenders: The Incarceration 
Addiction, 40 VILL. L. REV. 335, 375 (1995) (“Without a stable address and phone, 
the [EM] program cannot be used for an otherwise eligible offender.”). 
 32. See DICK WHITFIELD, THE MAGIC BRACELET 106 (2001) [hereinafter 
WHITFIELD, THE MAGIC BRACELET]. Whitfield cites the American Civil Liberties 
Union’s (ACLU) concern that EM would deny offenders an equal opportunity to 
participate by discriminating against those without homes and telephones. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See Brian K. Payne & Randy R. Gainey, The Electronic Monitoring of 
Offenders Released from Jail or Prison: Safety, Control, and Comparisons to the 
Incarceration Experience, 84 PRISON J. 413, 415 (2004). 
 35. See WHITFIELD, THE MAGIC BRACELET, supra note 32, at 109. 
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and eventually, public-private partnerships,36 and the commercial 
pressures of the private sector may have led to overselling and 
unrealistically high expectations.37 The powerful interest groups that 
form this sector may have framed EM as more advantageous than it 
actually was,38 thereby contributing to “the unexpectedly slow 
development of electronic monitoring.”39  
Third, EM programs typically target low-risk offenders.40 The term 
“low-risk” reflects both the actual offenses committed and the 
characteristics of the offenders, including first-time offenders, those who 
committed non-violent or property offenses, and those with structured 
living arrangements.41 Moderate- to high-risk offenders may also be 
subjected to EM programming, but the EM used for these types of 
offenders consistently differs from that used for those who are 
considered to be lesser risks.42 Specifically, “[in] low-risk populations, 
EM may be used by itself or in conjunction with other forms of low-
contact monitoring. In moderate to high-risk populations, EM is more 
likely to be one part of a program that involves human contact and 
supervision, drug treatment, or other services.”43 Accordingly, for 
higher risk offenders, EM may prove to be a more rehabilitative and 
complete alternative to prison. Yet, because further research is 
necessary, this conclusion is, at best, a speculative one. For now, those 
most often selected for EM programming, whether passive or active, 
continue to be those who are low-risk offenders, or as some have 
argued, those that “probably don’t need to be monitored anyway.”44 
 
 36. See id. 
 37. See id. at 112–13. 
 38. See WHITFIELD, TACKLING THE TAG, supra note 13, at 47 (“’Success’ rates on 
electronic monitoring—as in so much of criminal justice—are infinitely elastic, 
easily manipulated and often conceal more than they reveal. They should be 
treated with considerable caution.”). 
 39. WHITFIELD, THE MAGIC BRACELET, supra note 32, at 113. 
 40. See MACKENZIE, supra note 21, at 319; see also WHITFIELD, TACKLING THE 
TAG, supra note 13, at 46; DeMichele & Payne, supra note 23, at 36 (recognizing 
that “community corrections focus on technologies designed for low-risk 
offenders because these offenders do not need face-to-face interaction . . . [and] 
are people who have committed crimes that deserve to be addressed but who do 
not present any unique risk to society”). 
 41. WHITFIELD, TACKLING THE TAG, supra note 13, at 46–47. 
 42. See Marc Renzema & Evan Mayo-Wilson, Can Electronic Monitoring 
Reduce Crime for Moderate to High-risk Offenders?, 1 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL 
CRIMINOLOGY 215, 215–16 (2005) (describing how the use of EM differs according 
to the type of risk an offender presents); see also DeMichele & Payne, supra note 
23, at 35 (“[M]any different practices are used to monitor offenders in the 
community, including classifying offenders by risks, needs and change levels.”). 
 43. Renzema & Mayo-Wilson, supra note 42, at 215–16. 
 44. WHITFIELD, TACKLING THE TAG, supra note 13, at 47 (citation omitted). 
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3. Electronic Monitoring in Alaska 
Alaska has adopted a passive EM system. The Anchorage 
Correctional Complex, for example, requires an offender to connect a 
large black box, a Field Monitoring Device, to the power and phone lines 
in her home.45 The offender must keep the phone lines clear at the 
designated call time and must answer after the fourth ring.46 In some 
instances, the offender must also provide a breath sample using a 
“sobrietor” device.47 More remotely, in Mat-Su Valley, the Kids Are 
People, Inc. EM program requires a juvenile probationer to connect a 
base unit to the phone line in her home.48 The offender must also wear 
an ankle bracelet that transmits signals to a receiving computer.49 Then, 
at preplanned intervals throughout the day, indicator lights trigger 
reporting from the offender so that information on her location is 
periodically updated into a file that is monitored and then reviewed by 
case managers at the Mat-Su Youth Corrections Office.50 
B.  The History of Electronic Monitoring Use in Law Enforcement 
1.  Early Electronic Monitoring Programming and Design 
Whether testing sobriety or ensuring that an offender remains 
within a certain radius, EM systems provide a means of enforcing 
compliance with conditions of supervised release, or “community 
control.”51 But this punitive aspect of “compliance” was not what the 
systems’ designers originally had in mind for the systems’ prototype.52 
Instead, the designers sought “to help offenders gain self-esteem and 
 
     45.   ALASKA DEP’T OF CORR., ANCHORAGE CORRECTIONAL COMPLEX ELECTRONIC 
MONITORING GUIDELINES FOR SOBRIETOR AND FIELD MONITORING DEVICE (FMD), 
available at http://www.correct.state.ak.us/corrections/institutions/anch/ 
docs/EM_Guidelines.pdf. 
     46.    Id. 
     47.    Id. 
     48.   N.E. Schafer & Pamela Martin, Justice Ctr., Univ. of Alaska Anchorage, 
Evaluation of a JAIBG-Funded Project: Voice and Location Telephone 
Monitoring of Juveniles 3–4 (2001), available at http:// 
justice.uaa.alaska.edu/research/2000/0010kap/0010.kap.pdf. 
     49.    Id. at 4. 
     50.    Id. 
     51.   See Ralph Kirkland Gable & Robert S. Gable, Electronic Monitoring: 
Positive Intervention Strategies, 69 FED. PROBATION 21, 21 (2005) (noting EM 
documents violations of community supervision better than more traditional 
procedures); see also MACKENZIE, supra note 21, at 319 (describing how 
technological advances of EM made it possible to ensure compliance with EM 
correctional programs). 
 52. See Gable & Gable, supra note 51, at 21. 
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socially valued skills.”53 Others, including Jack Love, a former federal 
public defender and judge, specifically sought to create a scheme that 
would keep individuals out of prison.54 Love focused on probationers 
who had breached their probation orders and, in 1983, first used an 
electronic device to monitor five offenders.55 He wanted to know 
whether EM would allow probation to continue on a restricted basis, 
reducing various white collar offenders’ exposure to risks of violence in 
prison.56 That curiosity helped stimulate the commercial use of EM for 
correctional purposes.57 Another system was developed by Thomas 
Moody in Florida, and “[b]y 1987, 21 states had reportedly begun EM 
programs, with more than 900 offenders being monitored.”58 “[B]y 1993, 
EM was employed in all fifty states . . . [and] approximately seventy 
thousand offenders were being monitored electronically.”59 By 2005, 
about twenty percent of community-based supervision programs in the 
United States had incorporated the use of EM and about twenty private 
companies provided the necessary equipment.60 
2. Prison Overcrowding as a Driving Force Behind the Growth of 
Electronic Monitoring Use 
Although a number of factors contributed to the rapid growth of 
EM programs in the 1980s and onward, prison overcrowding is 
consistently cited as a driving force.61 In the 1980s, prison populations 
 
 53. Id. 
 54. See id.; see also WHITFIELD, TACKLING THE TAG, supra note 13, at 34. 
 55. Gable & Gable, supra note 51, at 21; see also WHITFIELD, TACKLING THE TAG, 
supra note 13, at 34. 
 56. See WHITFIELD, TACKLING THE TAG, supra note 13, at 34. 
 57. Id. at 33–34; see also Gable & Gable, supra note 51, at 21. Inspired by “a 
‘Spiderman’ story in which the villain attached an electronic bracelet to 
Spiderman to monitor his movements,” Judge Jack Love persuaded Michael 
Goss to develop a similar apparatus. Id. His curiosity helped develop and 
commercialize EM equipment. Id. But Judge Love was not the first to experiment 
with EM. Id. Dr. Ralph Schwitzgebel of Harvard University is credited with 
patenting the first correctional EM system in 1969. Id. 
 58. See Gable & Gable, supra note 51, at 21 (citation omitted). 
 59. MACKENZIE, supra note 21, at 319  (citation omitted). 
 60. See Gable & Gable, supra note 51, at 21. 
 61. See, e.g., Michael G. Maxfield & Terry L. Baumer, Home Detention with 
Electronic Monitoring: Comparing Pretrial and Postconviction Programs, 36 CRIME & 
DELINQ. 521, 521–22 (1990). In addition to prison and jail overcrowding, factors 
contributing to the rapid growth of EM included private entrepreneurs’ 
aggressive marketing of EM equipment as a solution to prison and jail 
overcrowding and the extension of home detention to broader categories of 
offenders, such as those directly released from prison or jail and those who had 
not been convicted but were held in lieu of bail. Id. at 522. Yet another was the 
belief in the infallibility of EM technology, also known as a “technofallac[y].” See 
Terry L. Baumer & Robert I. Mendelsohn, Electronically Monitored Home 
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“had reached a crisis point in both legal and financial terms” and led to 
judicial mandates to limit prison intake.62 Unfortunately, the situation is 
no better today and, for Alaska, the problem is particularly acute. In the 
1980s, the state expanded its justice system and enforced stiffer, more 
uniform sentences for the most serious felonies.63 A sharp increase in the 
number of incarcerated individuals resulted.64 By 2007, Alaska had five 
times the inmates it had in 1981, and spending for the state’s justice 
system almost doubled in those years.65 An immediate solution was 
needed both in the state and across the country, and the technologically 
advanced (and less expensive) alternative of EM offered a seemingly 
“quick fix.”66 The shortcomings of probation programs only added to 
the “nothing works” debate and incentivized the rapid rise of EM 
programs in correctional systems.67 
3. The Interests Served and Overarching Goals of Correctional 
Electronic Monitoring Programs 
Effective marketing of EM equipment by retailers also contributed 
to the rapid rise of correctional EM.68 As any profit-seeking businessmen 
would do, these retailers saw an opportunity in the prison 
overcrowding crisis and seized it.69 And, by strategically offering an 
inexpensive, utilitarian, and immediate solution to overcrowded 
prisons, EM vendors found a receptive audience in correctional 
departments across the country.70 These departments faced a pressing 
need to protect their communities from potentially dangerous offenders 
 
Confinement: Does it Work?, in SMART SENTENCING: THE EMERGENCE OF 
INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS (J.M. Byrne, A.J. Lurigio, & J. Petersilia eds., 1992) 54, 
54; see also WHITFIELD, THE MAGIC BRACELET, supra note 32, at 9 (citing “technical 
advances, a huge and costly rise in prison populations and the growing use of 
house arrest or curfew schemes” as the three reasons why, in the 1980s, the 
increased development of EM became possible). 
 62. WHITFIELD, TACKLING THE TAG, supra note 13, at 35. 
 63. THE COST OF CRIME, supra note 1, at 2. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 1. 
 66. See WHITFIELD, TACKLING THE TAG, supra note 13, at 36 (describing how 
the allure of new EM technology and the belief that it would provide an 
immediate solution to the problem of rising crime led to the rapid growth of EM 
programming). 
 67. See id. at 37 (explaining the failures of traditional probation that led to a 
sudden rush for experimental alternatives such as EM). 
 68. See Maxfield & Baumer, supra note 61, at 522. 
 69. See id. 
 70. See id. 
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and could not do so with prisons at maximum capacity.71 They therefore 
had a strong interest in a solution that would specifically deter 
offenders—one that would keep potentially dangerous offenders off the 
streets and under appropriate custody.72 EM programming appeared to 
offer just that.73 
In reality, the conditions imposed under EM programs are less 
restrictive than those imposed under traditional incarceration.74 This 
means the use of EM may actually benefit the same individuals it is 
supposed to punish.75 EM programs provide certain offenders a more 
rehabilitative option of reintegrating back into their communities while 
still serving time for their wrongdoings.76 As a result, the programs may 
promise more return as specific and utilitarian deterrents (in terms of 
providing efficient, economic, and secure public safety) and even more 
as rehabilitating and reintegrative alternatives to incarceration. And it is 
quite possibly this promise—rather than one rooted in a retributive 
goal—that has maintained the growth of EM programming in 
corrections.77 
But while the growing number of EM programs might point to 
success in terms of quantity, a few questions still remain: Have the 
programs succeeded in terms of quality? How do the programs compare 
to incarceration or other punitive options? Is EM enough of a sanction? 
Is it efficient? What is the best use of EM programming for Alaska? 
 
 71. See id. at 521–22 (describing how chronic overcrowding in jails and 
prisons led “to desperation on the part of criminal justice officials . . . [and] a 
frantic search for punitive, safe, and secure alternatives to incarceration”). 
 72. See The Legality of Innovative Sanctions for Nonviolent Crimes, 111 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1944, 1960–61 (1998) (discussing criminal sentencing’s goal of protecting the 
public from dangerous offenders through incarnation). 
 73. See Maxfield & Baumer, supra note 61, at 522. 
 74. See Payne & Gainey, supra note 34, at 432 (recognizing that although EM 
is less restrictive than other sanctions, it “is still punitive and potentially 
rehabilitative” even if it “is often misinterpreted as a slap on the wrist”). 
 75. Offenders commented that they preferred EM to incarceration and 
viewed EM as controlling, but not nearly as controlling or invasive as prison; the 
EM option afforded them certain everyday luxuries and freedoms that they were 
denied in prison. Id. at 428. For example, they enjoyed control over the television 
and being able to eat whatever they wanted and whenever they wanted. Id. 
 76. See id. at 416. 
 77. Retributive rationales for punishment often conflict with utilitarian and 
rehabilitative rationales.  See generally Frase, supra note 4, at 75–77 (discussing the 
limitations of and conflicts between various contemporary sentencing 
rationales). The attractive promise advertised by EM retailers appeared to 
resolve this conflict and therefore appealed to correctional departments both in 
the United States and abroad. However, EM programs probably hold more 
“promise” as deterrents and even more so as mechanisms of 
rehabilitation/reintegration for reasons discussed below. See infra Part III.B.  
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The remainder of this Note will address these questions and others 
and will ultimately propose a solution that maximizes the potential of 
EM in Alaska by incorporating it into other correctional programs. 
II.  THE LAW ON ELECTRONIC MONITORING 
Any attempt to maximize the potential of EM must comport with 
the current law on the subject, and therefore, it is critical to understand 
the parameters of that statutory framework. This Part endeavors to 
explain the relevant statutes and case law effecting EM in Alaska. 
Because EM is still relatively new and EM programming is still gaining 
momentum as an “effective” alternative to incarceration, the law 
governing its use is sparse and still developing. This is especially true in 
Alaska. A few statutes and cases provide some guidance, but the law on 
the correctional use of EM is far from settled. 
A.  The Statutes Governing Correctional Electronic Monitoring in 
Alaska 
At present, two statutes control the use of EM in Alaska—Section 
33.30.061, and more significantly, Section 30.30.065 of the Alaska 
Statutes. Section 33.30.061(c) allows for the use of EM at the discretion of 
the Department of Corrections commissioner but expressly excludes 
certain classes of offenders: 
The commissioner may, under [section 33.30.365], designate a 
prisoner to serve the prisoner’s term of imprisonment or period 
of temporary commitment, or a part of the term or period, by 
electronic monitoring. A prisoner serving a term of 
imprisonment, or a period of temporary commitment, for a 
crime involving domestic violence is not eligible for electronic 
monitoring.78  
Section 33.30.065 provides specific, practical guidelines for 
administering EM.79 Subsection (a) mandates that EM be administered 
by the Department of Corrections and that EM equipment be designed 
“so that any attempt to remove, tamper with, or disable the monitoring 
equipment or to leave the place selected for the service of the term or 
period will result in a report or notice to the department.”80 Subsection 
(b) lists criteria for 
 
 78. ALASKA STAT. § 33.30.061(c) (2010). 
 79. § 33.30.065. 
 80. § 33.30.065(a). 
ALLADINA_FINAL_2 5/6/2011  2:27:14 PM 
136 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [28:1 
determining whether to designate a prisoner to serve a term of 
imprisonment or period of temporary commitment by 
electronic monitoring, [including] 
(1) safeguards to the public 
(2) the prospects for the prisoner’s rehabilitation 
(3) the availability of program and facility space 
(4) the nature and circumstances of the offense for which 
the prisoner was sentenced or for which the prisoner is 
serving a period of temporary commitment; 
(5) the needs of the prisoner as determined by a 
classification committee and any recommendations 
made by the sentencing court; 
(6) the record of convictions of the prisoner, with 
particular emphasis on crimes specified in AS 11.41 or 
crimes involving domestic violence; 
(7) the use of drugs or alcohol by the prisoner; and 
(8) other criteria considered appropriate by the 
commissioner.81 
Subsection (c) emphasizes that EM does not provide an offender 
with a liberty interest and that a “prisoner may be returned to a 
correctional facility at the discretion of the commissioner.”82 Subsection 
(d) permits the commissioner to require an offender to pay all or some of 
the costs of EM, but acknowledges that only offenders with sufficient 
financial resources should be subjected to such a requirement.83 
Both sections 33.30.061(c) and 33.30.065 of the Alaska Statutes only 
pertain to sentencing.84 In Alaska, there is no statutory law on the use of 
EM for pretrial, pre-sentencing, or pre-appeal purposes. The closest such 
statute, section 12.25.025(c) of the Alaska Statutes, has been interpreted 
to extend credit for time spent in pretrial, pre-conviction, or pre-appeal 
custody,85 but this has not included time spent on EM—yet.86 And while 
several cases have explained the applications of section 12.25.025(c) of 
the Alaska Statutes in non-EM situations, the statute has proven quite 
controversial with respect to EM. 
 
 81. § 33.30.065(b). 
 82. § 33.30.065(c). 
 83. § 33.30.065(d). 
 84. See § 33.30.61(c);  § 33.30.065. 
      85.  § 12.55.025(c) (“A defendant shall receive credit for time spent in custody 
pending trial, sentencing, or appeal, if the detention was in connection with the 
offense for which sentence was imposed.”). 
 86. Matthew v. State, 152 P.3d 469, 473 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007). 
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B.  The Case Law on Alternatives to Incarceration 
The case law governing EM use in Alaska has developed in 
response to the enactment of statutes governing alternatives to 
incarceration (mainly sections 12.25.025(c), 33.30.061(c), and 33.30.065 of 
the Alaska Statutes) and case law directing the use of those alternatives. 
This precedent has set limits on alternatives to incarceration, and the 
limits, in turn, have implications for EM. Understanding the precedent 
governing alternatives to incarceration is therefore useful for 
understanding the current status of correctional EM in the state. 
1.  The Early Cases Defining Appropriate Alternatives to Incarceration 
In its 1980 decision Lock v. State, the Alaska Supreme Court ruled 
that “upon revocation of probation, one is entitled to credit against his 
sentence on the original offense for time spent as a condition of 
probation, in a rehabilitation program which imposes substantial 
restrictions on one’s freedom of movement and behavior.”87 In Nygren v. State, 
the Alaska Court of Appeals sought to determine what types of 
restrictions meet the “’substantial restrictions on one’s freedom of movement 
and behavior’” test.88 It concluded that credit for time served while 
released on bail or probation is determined by the “extent to which a 
person released on bail or probation is subjected to restrictions 
approximating those experienced by one who is incarcerated.”89 The 
court also listed several characteristics common to incarcerative 
facilities, noting that those characteristics, though not exhaustive, were 
“at least sufficient to serve as sound points of reference for determining, 
in any given case, whether ‘substantial restrictions on one’s freedom of 
movement and behavior’ have been imposed, so as to require credit for 
time served under Lock.”90 The list included the following restrictive 
characteristics: 
[R]esidents are invariably sent there by court order; the 
facilities require residency, and residency requirements are 
sufficiently stringent to involve a definite element of 
confinement; residents of the facilities are subject to twenty-
four hour physical custody or supervision; any periods during 
which residents may be permitted to leave the facility are 
expressly limited, both as to time and purpose; while in the 
 
 87. Lock v. State, 609 P.2d 539, 545 (Alaska 1980) (emphasis added).  
 88. Nygren v. State, 658 P.2d 141, 144 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (emphasis 
added) (quoting Lock, 609 P.2d at 545). 
 89. Id. at 146. 
 90. Id. 
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facility, residents are under a continuing duty to conform their 
conduct to institutional rules and to obey orders of persons 
who have immediate custody over them; and residents are 
subject to sanctions if they violate institutional rules or orders 
and to arrest if they leave the facility without permission.91 
2.  Cases Applying the Nygren Example to Non-Electronic Monitoring 
Alternatives 
The Nygren test has already been applied to award credit for time 
served in residential alcoholism treatment programs92 and Community 
Residential Centers (CRCs).93 In the 2002 case State v. Fortuny, the Alaska 
Court of Appeals gave the defendant credit against his sentence for the 
time he voluntarily spent in a residential alcoholism treatment facility 
before sentencing.94 The court began its analysis by first comparing the 
Nygren list of restrictions (deemed equivalent to incarceration) to the 
restrictions imposed by the residential program in which Fortuny 
participated. It reasoned that the defendant’s work release privileges at 
the facility were “not conspicuously different from the work release 
privileges that are granted to selected prisoners in the custody of the 
Department of Corrections.”95 The court also noted that the facility 
provided twenty-four hour supervision, required conformity to a set of 
house rules, and subjected residents to bed checks, random checks, and 
random urine and breath tests.96 Because these restrictions generally 
complied with the remainder of the Nygren factors, the court granted 
Fortuny credit for the time he served there and ruled that work release 
constituted “a supplemental method of correction” rather than “a 
vacation from correctional supervision.”97 
That same year, in Potter v. State, the court was presented with the 
question of whether Nygren credit could be applied to time spent under 
the court-ordered custody of a CRC prior to sentencing.98 Again, the 
court began its analysis by going through the Nygren test.99 It then 
reasoned that the restrictions imposed by the CRC in custody of Potter 
amounted to incarceration as defined by Nygren. It emphasized how the 
 
 91. Id. 
 92. See, e.g., State v. Fortuny, 42 P.3d 1147, 1147–50 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002). 
 93. See, e.g., Potter v. State, No. A-8080, 2002 WL 818059, *1–2 (Alaska Ct. 
App. May 1, 2002). 
 94. See Fortuny, 42 P.3d at 1152. 
 95. Id. at 1151. 
 96. Id. at 1148–49. 
 97. Id. at 1151–52. 
 98. Potter, 2002 WL 818059, at *1. 
 99. See id. at *2. 
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CRC required Potter to remain there under strict supervision, only 
permitted him to leave unescorted under limited circumstances, and 
would subject him to sanctions if he violated program rules and 
regulations.100 Much as it did in Fortuny, the court relied on the Nygren 
test and held that Potter should not be barred from receiving credit 
toward the time he served at the CRC merely because he was regularly 
allowed to leave the facility to work.101 
By testing the Nygren list of restrictions approximating 
incarceration against the specific restrictions imposed by various 
incarcerative facilities, the Alaska Court of Appeals effectively extended 
credit for time served in residential alcohol treatment programs and 
CRCs prior to sentencing. Its decisions in Fortuny and Potter also 
cemented the fact that work release privileges would not hinder a 
defendant from receiving credit for time served at a residential alcohol 
treatment program or CRC prior to sentencing. Unfortunately, the same 
has not been true of EM programming since the Alaska Court of 
Appeals has firmly refused to extend credit to time served on EM prior 
to sentencing.102 
3.  Why Electronic Monitoring Does Not Fit the Nygren Test – the 
Matthew v. State Perspective 
In Matthew v. State, the Alaska Court of Appeals denied defendant 
Matthew credit toward his sentence of imprisonment for the time he 
voluntarily spent subjected to EM.103 After his sentencing, Matthew 
asked the trial court to delay the date on which he was to report for 
incarceration.104 He specifically asked for a sixty-day extension that 
would allow him to work in Barrow while being monitored by a private 
EM system known as “secure continuous remote alcohol monitoring,” or 
SCRAM.105 The SCRAM system is an ankle bracelet that detects alcohol 
consumption through skin pores and tracks a subject’s whereabouts 
through an attached global positioning system, or GPS.106 In Alaska it is 
operated by a private company, Alaska Monitoring Services.107 
 
 100. See id. 
 101. See id. 
 102. Matthew v. State, 152 P.3d 469, 473 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007). 
 103. See id. at 471, 473. 
 104. See id. at 470. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id.; see also Alcohol Monitoring Systems, Inc., The SCRAMx System, 
SCRAMX, http://www.alcoholmonitoring.com/index/scram/the-scramx-
system (last visited Feb. 18, 2011) (describing SCRAMx,  the new generation of 
the SCRAM system). 
 107. Matthew, 152 P.3d at 470. 
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Per Matthew’s request, the trial judge granted the stay of 
imprisonment and ordered him confined to work, home, and travel back 
and forth.108 The judge also told him that no credit would be awarded 
toward his sentence for any time served while released on EM.109 The 
same occurred at Matthew’s bail hearing, where he was granted another 
delay of his imprisonment.110 Nevertheless, Matthew attempted to 
obtain credit toward his sentence of imprisonment for the time he spent 
subjected to EM.111 His motion was denied, and Matthew subsequently 
appealed.112 
In its ultimate ruling, the appellate court incorporated the same 
analytical method it did in both Fortuny and Potter, starting with a 
review of the Nygren test.113 It also noted that it must review de novo 
whether the conditions of release imposed on Matthew sufficiently 
approximated incarceration.114 The court then analyzed the conditions of 
release Matthew faced under EM.115 It found that those restrictions 
included requirements that Matthew be at home, work, or commuting in 
between and that his movements and alcohol consumption be 
constantly monitored by EM.116 It further found that the restrictions did 
not amount to “‘restrictions approximating those experienced by one 
who is incarcerated.’”117 
The court reasoned that “Matthew’s day-to-day activities were 
unencumbered by the kind of institutional rules and routines that are 
the hallmark of correctional or residential rehabilitative facilities.”118 It 
also observed that “[t]he conditions of release did not subject him to the 
kind of structured, regimented lifestyle that is the central feature of both 
incarceration and residential treatment programs.”119 The court then 
explained its interpretation of EM’s shortcomings, specifying that 
Matthew “could do whatever he wanted to do (except for consume 
alcohol) and was free to associate with whomever he wanted.”120 
Moreover, he “did not suffer the same lack of privacy experienced by an 
 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 471. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. See id. 
 114. Id. at 472. 
 115. See id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. (quoting Nygren v. State, 658 P.2d 141, 146 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983)).  
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 473. 
ALLADINA_FINAL_2 5/6/2011  2:27:14 PM 
2011 ELECTRONIC MONITORING IN ALASKA  141 
offender in an incarcerative facility or residential program.”121 The court 
again referred to its analysis as an application of the Nygren test before 
concluding that the restrictions imposed on Matthew did not 
“‘approximate those experienced by one who is incarcerated.’”122 
In its reasoning, the court broadly claimed to have applied the 
Nygren test, but a closer examination suggests that it instead focused on 
one particular Nygren factor,123 that “while in the facility, residents are 
under a continuing duty to conform their conduct to institutional rules 
and to obey orders of persons who have immediate custody over 
them.”124 Such a focus fits with the fact that EM differs from residential 
alcohol treatment programs and CRCs in one critical respect—an 
offender lives within the confines of his or her own home (or other 
private residence) rather than in a communal or more institutional 
facility. In recognizing a structured, regimented lifestyle as “the central 
feature of both incarceration and residential treatment programs” and 
institutional rules and routines as “the hallmark of correctional or 
residential rehabilitative facilities,”125 the court elevated the significance 
of this one Nygren factor to become more of a requirement rather than a 
mere “point of reference.”126 Its decision to deny Matthew credit for the 
time he served on EM turned on a perceived lack of institutional rules, 
regulations, and structure in EM correctional programming.127 
4.  Rethinking the Outcome in Matthew v. State128 
In its interpretation of Nygren, the court in Matthew failed to clarify 
what is meant by “institutional rules and routines.” For example, are 
institutional rules and routines only administered in an institution? 
Because the Department of Corrections administers EM sanctions, are 
the regulations imposed under EM still institutional? Do such 
institutional rules and routines completely inhibit an incarcerated 
individual from exercising any free will, enjoying free association, or 
 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
    123.  Id. at 472–73. 
 124. Nygren v. State, 658 P.2d 141, 146 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983). 
 125. Matthew, 152 P.3d at 472. 
 126. See Nygren, 658 P.2d at 146 (explaining that although not exhaustive, the 
common characteristics of incarcerative facilities set out in Nygren “are at least 
sufficient to serve as sound points of reference for determining, in any given 
case, whether ‘substantial restrictions on one’s freedom of movement and 
behavior’ have been imposed, so as to require credit for time served under Lock” 
(quoting Lock v. State, 609 P.2d 539, 545 (Alaska 1980))). 
 127. See Matthew, 152 P.3d at 472–73. 
 128. The author gives special thanks to Professor Lisa Kern Griffin, Duke 
University School of Law, for her assistance with the development of this 
section. 
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maintaining privacy? None of these questions are answered by the 
Court of Appeals in Matthew. As a result, if EM is to obtain independent 
standing as an alternative to incarceration—one that could give credit 
toward an offender’s sentence—a reworking of the Matthew decision is 
necessary. 
Nygren aside, the decision in Matthew may affect how other courts 
interpret credit for time served on EM when it is used before trial or 
prior to sentencing. This, in turn, could influence whether these courts 
will ever interpret EM as a sufficient sanction, at least with respect to 
retribution rationales. In other words, the parameters placed on the use 
of EM in the pretrial context could affect those placed on EM sanctions. 
Moreover, the purposes of pretrial detention (especially pretrial release 
under EM) could also have an effect on EM sanctions. Instead of 
retribution, punishment, or general deterrence, the rationale behind 
pretrial detention is based on protecting communities from potentially 
dangerous offenders (specific deterrence) and ensuring that offenders 
appear at court proceedings.129 EM’s strength is just that (in addition to 
serving rehabilitative or reintegrative purposes). Thus, the strengths of 
EM are most apparent in the pretrial context. It is very likely that EM 
also has unrealized potential as a sanction, but policymakers and 
lawmakers must first examine its use in the pretrial context to determine 
what works and what challenges may arise in the sentencing context. 
The Matthew court’s treatment of EM credits suggests that there 
might be some reluctance to viewing EM as a sufficient sanction. In its 
analysis, the court emphasized EM’s inability to satisfy the “institutional 
rules” prong of Nygren.130 It also expressed a concern that Matthew “did 
not suffer the same lack of privacy experienced by an offender in an 
incarcerative facility or residential program.”131 That concern might be 
even more acute in the sentencing context. But, while the court was 
correct in acknowledging that EM is advantageous to offenders, its 
reasoning was somewhat misguided. 
An offender may watch television at his will or choose what he will 
have for lunch while subjected to home confinement under EM, but his 
privacy is hardly undisturbed. He must respond to routine phone calls 
or video check-ins, may have his every move tracked by an electronic 
device, and may be subjected to random checks or visits from EM 
 
 129. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION STANDARDS, Pretrial Release Standard 10-
1.1: Purposes of the Pretrial Release Decision, available at http:// 
www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards/pretrialrelease_blk.html#10-1.1; see also 
Maxfield & Baumer, supra note 61, at 534 (“Pretrial detention seeks to protect the 
public while bringing defendants to trial.”). 
 130. See Matthew, 152 P.3d at 472. 
 131. Id. at 473. 
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officers or administrators. These constraints clearly do not amount to 
those experienced under traditional incarceration, but they are 
nevertheless adequate. In fact, the use of EM may very well be 
advantageous for the correctional system as a whole because it frees 
space in jails and prisons, it costs less than incarceration, and it benefits 
yet penalizes offenders. So even though EM may fall short under a strict 
application of Nygren, it would likely prove viable under a broader 
assessment. In particular, when a court-ordered sanction is at issue, EM 
could prove particularly viable because a court-ordered sanction 
presumably imposes the most stringent possible requirements. 
Accordingly, and in spite of the suggestion in Matthew, a court-ordered 
EM sanction could prove even more successful than its pretrial 
counterpart, which is designed as an alternative to detention and which 
presumes release. 
The court’s “something is missing with EM” opinion in Matthew 
hinders defendants from obtaining credit for pretrial, pre-appeal, and 
pre-sentencing release under EM, and therefore it has limited EM’s 
potential as an alternative to incarceration. A solution that resolves EM’s 
supposed lack of institutional structure would likely remedy the 
problem. One particularly promising option is to incorporate EM into 
other court-approved alternatives to pretrial, pre-appeal, and pre-
sentencing incarceration, such as residential alcohol treatment programs 
or CRCs. A proposal for such a “hybrid” use of EM and other 
alternatives to incarceration is presented in Part IV. 
III. THE POTENTIAL AND THE CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING THE 
USE OF ELECTRONIC MONITORING 
This Part will address the broader potential and possible pitfalls of 
EM—an analysis that must necessarily precede any Alaska-specific 
proposal for new, or modified, EM programming. The Alaska Court of 
Appeals’ recent decision in Matthew reflects a narrow view of EM’s 
potential and thus provides an interesting point of comparison. That 
view might lead to a conclusion that EM is less valuable than 
incarceration. But, as noted by the National Law Enforcement and 
Corrections Technology Center, “EM offers two distinct advantages over 
incarceration.”132 The first is cost-effectiveness.133 The second is a 
reduction in prison overcrowding.134 For the purposes of this Note, these 
 
 132. NLECTC, supra note 23, at 1. 
 133. See id. 
 134. Id. 
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“advantages” will be respectively analyzed in terms of efficiency and 
effectiveness. 
A.  The Efficiency Rationale 
1.  A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Electronic Monitoring 
On average, EM programs cost between five and twenty-five 
dollars per day.135 Incarceration costs, on the other hand, average fifty 
dollars a day—at least twice the cost of EM.136 Yet, the comparatively 
inexpensive EM equipment is not the only cost-effective benefit that EM 
programs promise. Other tangible benefits include pretrial release of 
offenders who would have otherwise been detained, early release from 
incarceration and the resulting reduction in overall confinement costs, 
reduced costs for repeated treatment enrollments, and finally, a 
diminished need for the construction of new prisons.137 The realization 
of such cost savings will vary according to the actual costs of 
incarceration and EM equipment and programming in a specific 
jurisdiction.138 In Alaska, the high number of inmates and lack of prison 
space is a particularly pressing issue.139 For example, the new Mat-Su 
prison, scheduled to open in 2012, is already expected to be full soon 
after it opens.140 Strategically expanding EM programming would offer a 
workable solution that could potentially curb the need for another Mat-
Su (or several) in the future. 
Already, Alaska has seen savings in social costs because EM 
programs allow offenders to work and later pay off the costs of EM 
participation.141 But such intangible savings are not all. Currently, the 
 
 135. See id. This claim was based on 1999 estimates of EM program costs. Id. 
 136. See id. In 1999, the cost of incarceration per inmate per day in Alaska was 
$97.92. In Louisiana, it was $30.36. ANN H. CROWE ET AL., AMERICAN PROBATION 
AND PAROLE ASS’N, OFFENDER SUPERVISION WITH ELECTRONIC TECHNOLOGY: A 
USER’S GUIDE 44 fig.5b (2002), available at http:// www.ncjrs.gov/ 
pdffiles1/nij/grants/197102.pdf. But cf. Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Office 
of Pub. Affairs, Costs of Incarceration and Supervision, THE THIRD BRANCH (May 
2004), http://www.uscourts.gov/News/TheThirdBranch/05-05-01/Costs_ 
of_Incarceration_and_Supervision.aspx (citing Bureau of Prisons statistics 
indicating that the cost of imprisonment in a Bureau of Prisons facility at the 
time was $63.51 per inmate per day). 
 137. See CROWE ET. AL., supra note 136, at 27, 44–45. 
 138. Id. 
 139. See generally THE COST OF CRIME, supra note 1. 
 140. Id. at 4 fig.8. 
 141. See CROWE ET AL., supra note 136, at 45; see also NLECTC, supra note 23, at 
1 (contending that communities benefit from EM “because offenders are paying 
taxes, taking care of their families, and sometimes even going to school to 
increase their future employment options”). 
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use of EM saves the state about twenty-two times more than it would 
spend on incarceration.142 This figure trumps all other alternatives to 
incarceration but falls short in one regard—reduced recidivism rates.143 
Other alternatives to prison have saved the state money and successfully 
reduced recidivism rates.144 Thus, with respect to recidivism, the failures 
of Alaska’s current correctional EM programming suggest that EM is not 
the cheap “quick fix” it may appear to be. 
And while EM is cost-effective relative to incarceration, there are 
still cost concerns. Intangible costs, or “hidden fees,” of EM use include 
initial investments in staff time for education and marketing purposes 
and investments in the planning process for incorporating EM use into 
existing correctional options.145 An increased net-widening effect 
(whereby offenders who would have otherwise been successfully 
supervised without EM would now be placed in an EM program), 
opportunity costs (in terms of other correctional programs that could be 
implemented), and increased technical violations (which could lead to 
additional court hearings or reincarceration and therefore result in extra 
costs to the justice system) also add to the cost of EM.146 These potential 
costs, along with concerns about the effectiveness of EM programming 
as opposed to incarceration or other alternatives, stress the need for 
careful and calculated spending on correctional EM. 
2. Electronic Monitoring on the Alaska Budget 
Alaska’s spending on correctional EM depends on several factors, 
with federal spending in Alaska the primary factor. After the 1980s oil 
boom faded, Alaska increasingly relied on federal spending to fuel the 
state’s economy.147 Between 1993 and 2003, federal spending in the state 
more than doubled (not counting inflation), but nationwide, federal 
spending increased only about fifty percent.148 Between 1996 and 2002, 
federal spending for grants jumped from $1.3 billion to $3.1 billion, and 
fifty-six percent of grants were undesignated.149 Because such 
undesignated grants could provide funding for electronic supervision 
 
 142. THE COST OF CRIME, supra note 1, at 3 fig.6. 
 143. See id. 
 144. Id. (providing examples of alternatives to incarceration that have saved 
the state money and helped reduce recidivism, including therapeutic courts and 
adult residential treatment for substance abuse). 
   145. CROWE ET AL., supra note 136, at 43. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Scott Goldsmith & Eric Larson, What Does $7.6 Billion in Federal Money 
Mean to Alaska?, UNDERSTANDING ALASKA, Nov. 2003, at 4, available at 
http://www.iser.uaa.alaska.edu/Publications/FedSpendSum.pdf. 
 148. Id. at 1. 
 149. See id. 
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programs, the fifty-six percent is critical. While it is true that grants are 
only one of several sources of EM program funding,150 in Alaska, federal 
spending and federal grants make up a vast portion of the state’s 
economy.151 As such, the ways in which federal grants are allocated 
could indirectly yet significantly impact the state’s correctional EM 
programs. Because Alaska is a young, developing state and because only 
a few private industries bring in new revenue, federal spending is 
important to the state’s economy and, ultimately, to EM 
programming.152 
Despite the ample (and increasing) federal spending in Alaska, 
total state spending on corrections has not experienced as substantial a 
jump—yet. The state’s operating budget has grown, but the percentage 
spent on corrections has been rather steady.153 This percentage has also 
lagged in comparison to other states. In Fiscal Year 2007, Alaska spent 
5.3% of its total state government expenditures on corrections while the 
nation on average spent 6.8%.154 Moreover, “[e]xpenditures for the major 
justice system agencies—Department of Corrections, Public Safety, and 
Law, the Alaska Court System, Public Defender Agency, and Office of 
Public Advocacy—have comprised about 9 percent of Alaska’s total 
state agency spending for the past ten years (FY 2000-2010).”155 The 
figures are especially dreary for correctional EM. For Fiscal Year 2009, 
the Department of Corrections received $245,962,000 in resources “to 
achieve results,”156 but just 914.1 Results Delivery Units (RDU) were 
 
 150. See CROWE ET AL., supra note 136, at 46–47 (discussing sources for EM 
program funding, including grants and government funding, private donations, 
in-kind resources and resource sharing, and offender fees). 
 151. See generally Goldsmith & Larson, supra note 147. 
 152. Id. at 2. 
 153. See Justice System Operating Expenditures, ALASKA JUST. F., Spring 2009, at 
1, 2, available at http://justice.uaa.alaska.edu/forum/26/1spring2009/ 
261.spring2009.pdf. The total operating budget for Alaska’s justice system (in 
actual expenditures) for Fiscal Year 2000 was $336,883,300, or 9.6% of the total 
state budget. Id. Of that amount, the Department of Corrections received 4.4%, 
or $153,725,500. Id. For Fiscal Year 2010, the total projected operating budget for 
the justice system is $566,220,700 (9.2% of the total state budget) and the total for 
the Department of Corrections is $224,223,300 (3.7%). Id. 
 154. See THE PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 
2008 14 (2008), available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/ 
uploadedFiles/ One%20in%20100.pdf. 
 155. See Justice System Operating Expenditures, supra note 153, at 2. 
 156. STATE OF ALASKA, FY2009 GOVERNOR’S OPERATING BUDGET, DEPARTMENT 
OF CORRECTIONS PERFORMANCE MEASURES 4 (2007), available at http:// 
www.gov.state.ak.us/omb/09_omb/budget/DOC/perfmeas_20.pdf.  
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allotted to EM.157 In contrast, 13,099.1 RDU were allotted to statewide 
probation and parole and 16,827.6 RDU were allotted to Community 
Residential Centers in an effort to manage prison populations.158 Clearly, 
if efficient EM use is to occur, Alaska will have to invest more in EM by 
adjusting spending priorities and allocating more resources to the 
Department of Corrections, which in turn should allocate more to EM 
programming. This will have to happen alongside a broader effort to 
attain more substantial federal grants for the state’s justice system. 
B.  The Effectiveness Rationale 
1.  What Does the Current Research Tell Us? General Purposes and 
Successes of Electronic Monitoring 
Other than cost savings, EM promises a reduction in prison 
overcrowding.159 But the promise actually extends much further. A few 
original purposes of EM included reintegrating offenders into the 
community, treating them, and to a lesser degree, punishing and 
deterring them from future criminal conduct.160 Others included public 
safety, compliance with mandates to reduce prison and jail 
overcrowding, and the provision of the most cost-effective correctional 
services.161 At present, however, these purposes have focused almost 
exclusively on inexpensive and safe ways to provide surveillance or 
incapacitation while relieving overcrowded jails and prisons.162 In a 
sense, then, these “new” purposes of EM actually tend to emulate the 
 
   157.  STATE OF ALASKA, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, COMPONENT SUMMARY FOR 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 2 (2009), available at http://www.gov.state.ak.us/omb/ 
10_omb/budget/DOC/amended/10amd_4-3-09_compsummary_gf_doc.pdf. 
 158. Id. 
 159. NLECTC, supra note 23, at 1. 
 160. Randy R. Gainey, Brian K. Payne & Mike O’Toole, The Relationship 
Between Time in Jail, Time on Electronic Monitoring, and Recidivism: An Event 
History Analysis of a Jail-Based Program, 17 JUST. Q. 733, 746 (2000). 
 161. CROWE ET AL., supra note 136, at 14. 
 162. See Jody Klein-Saffran, Electronic Monitoring vs. Halfway Houses: A Study 
of Federal Offenders, ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION, Fall 1995, at 1 (excerpts 
from unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of Maryland) (stating that the 
primary purpose of current community corrections programs is to provide 
surveillance or incapacitation for as little cost as possible), http:// 
www.bop.gov/news/research_projects/published_reports/gen_program_eval
/orepralternatives.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2011); see also DeMichele & Payne, 
supra note 23, at 34 (discussing Rios and Greene’s notion of the justice 
reinvestment movement, a concept suggesting that current use of community 
corrections is meant to offset state budgets by serving as an alternative to 
incarceration) (citing N. RIOS & J. GREENE, REDUCING RECIDIVISM: A REVIEW OF 
EFFECTIVE STATE INITIATIVES (2009)). 
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retributive and deterrent purposes of incarceration, which primarily 
seek “to punish offenders, to protect society by removing dangerous 
offenders from society, and to deter future criminal behavior.”163 
Alaska’s current EM program is an apt example. As such, when 
evaluating the effectiveness of the program, the state’s policymakers 
must keep in mind the many different purposes EM was intended to 
serve (as opposed to incarceration) and the diverse goals it aspired to 
achieve. Doing so will help these policymakers understand how to 
combine EM with other sanctions to maximize its potential.164 
At this point, regrettably little is known about the effectiveness of 
EM as an alternative to incarceration, and it is still unclear whether EM 
has successfully met its purported purposes and goals.165 The 
uncertainty results from sparse research into the operation and impact 
of EM166 and a lack of empirical proof.167 More rigorous empirical 
research is necessary to render reliable and widely applicable 
conclusions,168 but until this occurs, the current research proves helpful 
in assessing the uses and general successes of EM. For example, EM has 
been cited as having at least three distinct uses.169 These include use in 
the pretrial context, use as a sanction in and of itself immediately after 
conviction, and use in conjunction with other sanctions (i.e., offenders 
who receive a jail or prison sentence and are subsequently placed on EM 
when released back into the community).170 Within the context of each 
use, EM has already had several successes.171 
 
 163. See Gainey, Payne & O’Toole, supra note 160, at 746 (describing the main 
purposes of incarceration). 
 164. See id. at 747 (suggesting that because the purposes of incarceration and 
EM are so different, it makes theoretical and practical sense to combine 
sentences for certain offenders). 
 165. Kathy G. Padgett, William D. Bales, & Thomas G. Blomberg, Under 
Surveillance: An Empirical Test of the Effectiveness and Consequences of Electronic 
Monitoring, 5 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y, 61, 65 (2006). “Although some form of 
home confinement with EM had been implemented in all 50 states by 1990 there 
is still little known about its effectiveness as an alternative to incarceration or in 
protecting public safety by reducing rates of reoffending.” Id.; see also Annesley 
K. Schmidt, Electronic Monitoring: What Does the Literature Tell Us?, 62 FED. 
PROBATION 10, 10 (1998) (explaining why little is definitively known about EM 
devices’ effectiveness). 
 166. See, e.g., Maxfield & Baumer, supra note 61, at 522. 
 167. Padgett, Bales, & Blomberg, supra note 165, at 65. 
 168. See id. (observing that researchers themselves have recognized that EM 
research “has not kept pace with the rapid implementation of the penal 
strategy”). 
 169. Payne & Gainey, supra note 34, at 415; see also CROWE ET AL., supra note 
136, at 14. 
 170. Id. 
 171. See infra text accompanying notes 172–76. 
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Pretrial home detention under EM has allowed suspects “to avoid 
the criminogenic environment found in many jails,”172 provided more 
access to attorneys,173 given another option to “those unable to post 
bond or to meet eligibility criteria for release on recognizance,” helped 
offenders maintain employment and family ties, and depending on the 
particular program, may even provide rehabilitative effects.174 
Immediately after conviction, EM serves punitive and rehabilitative 
purposes, protects public safety by subjecting offenders to a controlled 
environment, and in some cases, deters offenders from committing new 
offenses.175 Finally, an EM sanction that follows time served in an 
incarcerative facility “affords offenders respect by trusting them with 
early release into the community.”176 
2. How Is the Success of Electronic Monitoring Measured? Common 
Methods of Evaluation 
The success of EM in the pretrial context, immediately after 
conviction, and following incarceration can be measured by several 
factors.177 After all, EM would hardly be effective (or desirable) if it only 
relieved prison and jail overcrowding.178 Accordingly, its success is often 
determined by answering a number of instructive questions: How many 
violations of EM conditions occurred? Did offenders fail to finish the full 
length of their EM sanctions? Was EM able to deter future misconduct? 
Is there public support of EM for less serious and less dangerous 
offenders? Did offenders still experience the pains of incarceration while 
serving time under EM supervision? Did they perceive the EM 
experience to be a punitive one?179 
Running through these questions are three purposes of criminal 
justice: retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation or reintegration.180 The 
 
 172. See Payne & Gainey, supra note 34, at 415. 
 173. See id. at 415–16. 
 174. See Maxfield & Baumer, supra note 61, at 523–24. 
 175. See Payne & Gainey, supra note 34, at 416. 
 176. Id.  
 177. Id. at 416–17 (listing EM’s successes pretrial, immediately after 
conviction, and postincarceration). 
 178. See Stephen J. Fay, Electronically Monitored Justice: A Consideration of 
Recent Evidence as to Its Effectiveness, 24 ANGLO-AM L. REV. 397, 424 (1995) (“Of 
course, to do something in response to prison and jail overcrowding is not 
necessarily to do something effective.”). 
 179. Payne & Gainey, supra note 34, at 416–17. 
 180. See DAVID LEVINSON, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 333–34 
(2002). According to Levinson, the two main justifications for punishment are 
retribution and prevention (deterrence) with rehabilitation and reintegration as 
secondary justifications often grouped under deterrence. Id. Having established 
the added and significant rehabilitative purpose of alternative sanctions such as 
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remainder of this section will attempt to probe the effectiveness of EM 
through these three lenses. 
a. The Retributive Model181 
EM is often considered less restrictive than other sanctions, 
especially incarceration.182 But while less restrictive, EM is still 
punitive.183 At least one study points to the lack of freedom experienced 
under EM.184 Others refer to the structure and control imposed by EM.185  
Taken together, the studies suggest commentators’ views on EM’s 
effectiveness that are in direct opposition to the one suggested by the 
Alaska Court of Appeals in Matthew v. State.186 There the court decided 
that EM did not approximate the restrictions experienced in prison or 
jail because Matthew “could do whatever he wanted to do (except for 
consume alcohol) and was free to associate with whomever he 
wanted.”187 He also “did not suffer the same lack of privacy experienced 
by an offender in an incarcerative facility or residential program.”188 
Although these observations were correct, the court appears to have 
taken a rather cursory view of EM’s retributive purpose. A 
comprehensive study of offenders’ perspectives on the Alaska EM 
program could shed light on this matter, providing the court with a 
more reliable and more informative basis for evaluating the freedom (or 
lack thereof) experienced under the Department of Correction’s EM 
program. 
Another broader concern about retribution entails the use of 
punishment in the pretrial context.189 The question often asked is 
whether it is ethical or logical to punish a “presumed innocent” 
 
EM, this Note elevates rehabilitation and reintegration to primary rather than 
secondary justifications for punishment. While all three justifications are 
evaluated in this Note, particular attention will be paid to the potential 
rehabilitative effect of EM. 
 181. According to Levinson, “[r]etribution is based on a theory that it is right 
to punish those who have committed a wrong.” Id. at 333. Black’s Law 
Dictionary defines it as “punishment imposed as repayment or revenge for the 
offense committed; requital” and “something justly deserved; repayment; 
reward.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1431 (9th ed. 2009). 
 182. See Payne & Gainey, supra note 34, at 432. 
 183. See id. at 426–27, 432. 
 184. See id. at 427. 
 185. Id. at 432. 
    186.   152 P.3d 469 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007). 
 187. Id. at 472–73. 
 188. Id. at 473. 
 189. See Maxfield & Baumer, supra note 61, at 523–24 (suggesting the use of 
EM can be both beneficial to offenders but also restrictive of offenders’ freedom). 
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defendant before he or she is convicted.190 Viewed in this regard, EM is 
all the more appropriate alternative to incarceration precisely because it 
is less restrictive than others.191 
b. The Deterrence Model 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines deterrence “as a goal of criminal 
law, the prevention of criminal behavior by fear of punishment.”192 As 
such, recidivism193 rates provide a “logical tool for measuring the 
performance of the criminal justice system in Alaska.”194 Alaska’s 
criminal justice system applies presumptive sentencing and significantly 
increases an offender’s sentence if she commits a new offense after an 
earlier conviction.195 “Thus, arrests and convictions of recent offenders 
are logical measures for the effectiveness of the system.”196 Already, 
recidivism reports have helped measure the success of various criminal 
justice programs and policies, including the effectiveness of the state’s 
therapeutic courts.197 The same is possible with respect to evaluating the 
effectiveness of Alaska’s EM program.198 
In 2007, the Alaska Judicial Council conducted the state’s first 
general study on recidivism.199 Unfortunately, the results were 
undeniably disappointing. Just three years after they were released from 
their sentences, “66% of all offenders in the sample had been re-
 
 190. See id. at 524 (proposing that “the propriety of trying to rehabilitate an 
unconvicted and presumed innocent pretrial population can be questioned”). 
 191. See id. at 523 (“Defendants wearing wristlets and confined to home or 
work face more restrictions than do those on bond, but awaiting trial at home is 
less restrictive than confinement in jail.”). 
 192. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 514 (9th ed. 2009). Deterrence is classified as 
either specific (“actions taken to prevent that defendant from committing future 
offenses”) or general (“actions designed to prevent others from committing 
crimes”) and falls under the broader category of prevention. LEVINSON, supra 
note 180, at 333. 
 193. Black’s Law Dictionary defines recidivism as “[a] tendency to relapse into 
a habit of criminal activity or behavior.” Id. at 1384. 
 194. Teresa W. Carns, Recidivism in Alaska, 25 ALASKA L. REV. ONLINE ARTICLES 
F. 1, 3 (2008), http://www.law.duke.edu/shell/cite.pl?25online+ 
Alaska+L.+Rev.+1+pdf. 
 195. See id. at 3. 
 196. Id. at 3–4. 
 197. Id. at 4. 
 198. See id. at 23. The Alaska Judicial Council’s first general study of 
recidivism in Alaska resulted in a comprehensive report entitled “Criminal 
Recidivism in Alaska,” published in January 2007. Id. at 1. The report has 
already aided the discussion of new Driving Under the Influence (DUI) 
legislation and will likely prove equally helpful in the discussion of new or 
restructured EM programming. Id. at 23. 
 199. See ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, CRIMINAL RECIDIVISM IN ALASKA Exec. 
Summary (2007), available at http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/reports/1-
07CriminalRecidivism.pdf. 
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incarcerated at least once, for a new offense or a probation or parole 
violation [and] 59% were arrested at least once for a new offense.”200 
Offenders were also “most likely to recidivate during the first year of 
release and even more so during the first six months.”201 Other 
recidivism studies have produced mixed results with respect to EM.202 
Some show that EM has successfully helped reduce recidivism rates.203 
Some show there is no difference in recidivism rates after EM and after 
incarceration.204 Nonetheless, even if EM does not reduce recidivism, 
unchanged conviction rates with EM still allow for a more cost-effective 
sanction overall.205 EM expert Dick Whitfield specifically suggests using 
EM as a part of a wider approach of deterrence.206 In his opinion, seeing 
how EM fits into a broader scheme of deterrence “is a much more 
realistic way of measuring the impact [it] has had, and the policy 
contribution it can make.”207 Of course, in assessing EM’s value as “part 
of a whole,” researchers and policymakers will have to keep in mind 
that EM is a strictly voluntary sanction, and therefore, the primary target 
for home confinement under EM will continue to be the “low-risk” 
offender who is not considered a threat to public safety.208 Unless there 
is such a combined, or “hybrid,” approach to EM and “unless there is a 
shift in emphasis away from surveillance and control towards (more 
expensive) treatment as the basis of intermediate sanctions, electronic 
 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 14. 
 202. See Gainey, Payne & O’Toole, supra note 160, at 737. (“Research findings 
. . . suggest that the effects of participation in house arrest with electronic 
monitoring are not clear-cut.”). 
 203. See id. at 737–38 (listing studies that suggest high rates of program 
completion for EM programs in which offenders were sentenced to house arrest 
with EM but not incarcerated). 
 204. See id. at 738. The authors specifically discuss a 1997 study comparing 
recidivism rates of offenders sentenced to jail with those of offenders sentenced 
to house arrest with EM. Id. The study found that the recidivism rates for both 
groups were relatively low and the differences between the groups were more or 
less negligible. Id. 
 205. See WHITFIELD, THE MAGIC BRACELET, supra note 32, at 92. Whitfield 
explains that EM’s cost-effectiveness has been used as a justification for 
expanding its use. Id. He then cautions that EM must nevertheless demonstrate 
an “added value” component if it is to become a more prominent part of 
sentencing schemes. Id. 
 206. See id. at 94. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Baumer & Mendelsohn, supra note 61, at 65.  EM is a strictly voluntary 
sanction because the incapacitation it provides is only supported by “the threat 
of detection and sanctions for violations.” Id. This suggests that low-risk 
offenders, who are a lesser threat to public safety, will remain the target 
population for participation in EM programming. Id. 
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monitoring is never likely to ‘deliver the goods’ in terms of reduced 
rates of recidivism.”209 
c. The Rehabilitation or Reintegration Model 
Rehabilitation is the last of the three traditional theories of criminal 
justice.210 Reintegration is closely associated with rehabilitation and 
seeks “to change deviant behavior, while emphasizing that the change 
can most effectively be accomplished in concert with the community, 
and not in a prison or jail.”211 The Alaska Constitution espouses these 
same views and even includes “the principle of reformation” as a policy 
underlying the state’s criminal justice system.212 And while “an 
offender’s constitutional right to rehabilitation does not extend beyond 
release from custody, Alaska law recognizes a public interest in 
rehabilitation.”213 One such interest involves public safety.214 Because 
studies have shown “a statistical relationship between a lack of 
employment and increased risk of recidivism,” released offenders 
should be given adequate opportunities for employment in order to 
prevent the potentially costly and dangerous consequences that would 
otherwise become the burden of the Alaska taxpayer.215 In fact, the 
Alaska Department of Corrections has explicitly referred to goals of 
“reformation” or “reintegration” in both its mission and vision 
statements.216 
This evident institutional support and promotion of the 
rehabilitative or reintegrating aspects of criminal justice implies that 
Alaska policymakers will likely endorse a reasonable and effective 
rehabilitative alternative to incarceration. Although some criticize EM as 
a lesser form of rehabilitation (because offenders released on home 
confinement do not get exposed to the social networks and rebuilding 
 
 209. Fay, supra note 178, at 422. 
 210. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1398 (9th ed. 2009).  Black’s Law Dictionary 
also defines rehabilitation as “[t]he process of seeking to improve a criminal’s 
character and outlook so that he or she can function in society without 
committing other crimes.” Id. 
 211. LEVINSON, supra note 180, at 334. 
 212. ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 12; see also Deborah Periman, The Hidden Impact of 
a Criminal Conviction: A Brief Overview of Collateral Consequences in Alaska, ALASKA 
JUST. F., Fall 2007, at 1, 1, available at http://justice.uaa.alaska.edu/ 
forum/24/3fall2007/243.fall2007.pdf. 
 213. Periman, supra note 212, at 6. 
 214. See id. 
 215. See id. 
 216. ALASKA DEP’T OF CORR., (last visited Jan. 30, 2011), http:// 
www.correct.state.ak.us/corrections/index.jsf;jsessionid=C565744BDA54E72C6
EE44270D1718602. 
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skills that incarcerated offenders are exposed to),217 EM gives eligible 
offenders the ability to maintain family ties,218 teaches them to control 
themselves and structure their daily activities,219 and ultimately eases 
them back into society by providing them with the tools necessary to 
reintegrate and comport with the expectations of their local 
communities.220 The dire statistics on recidivism in Alaska provide yet 
another compelling (and cost-effective) reason to reallocate current 
resources to “re-entry” programs that can reduce recidivism by helping 
offenders adjust to the expectations of mainstream society and their local 
communities.221 EM is a fitting program in this regard. 
In order to consistently reach its full rehabilitative potential, EM 
should be combined with other correctional programs that focus on 
treatment.222 This will require a much more substantial financial 
investment in combined EM efforts and a major shift away from 
surveillance and control to a more integrative, and hence, more 
rehabilitative and reintegrating option.223 
IV. ELECTRONIC MONITORING AS A VIABLE BUT INCOMPLETE 
ALTERNATIVE TO INCARCERATION 
As an alternative to incarceration, home confinement under EM has 
proven significantly more cost-effective.224 Nonetheless, its ability to 
 
 217. See Fay, supra note 178, at 409 (arguing that EM, “in its obsession with 
potential cost-savings . . . ignores the value of assessment, counseling and 
support offered by experienced probation personnel”); see id. at 416 (suggesting 
that “rehabilitation is seldom a specific objective of electronic monitoring 
[programs]”). 
 218. See Payne & Gainey, supra note 34, at 428 (summarizing statements from 
offenders sentenced to EM that note EM gives offenders the ability to maintain 
ties with their families). 
 219. See Maxfield & Baumer, supra note 61, at 524 (stating that EM forces 
participating offenders to plan their activities and may thus impose order on 
heretofore disorderly lives). 
 220. See Payne & Gainey, supra note 34, at 416 (proposing that the use of EM 
as a sanction has rehabilitative effects and helps offenders reintegrate into the 
community). 
 221. See ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, CRIMINAL RECIDIVISM IN ALASKA, supra note 
199, at 14; see also Carns, supra note 194, at 27. 
 222. See Fay, supra note 178, at 417 (discussing how researchers have already 
recognized that EM programs should include a treatment component and 
focusing on the insistence that EM be accompanied by treatment plans that cater 
to each individual offender and are designed to have effects that last beyond the 
offender’s release date). 
 223. See id. at 423. 
 224. See THE COST OF CRIME, supra note 1, at 3 fig.6 (demonstrating that the use 
of EM saves the state about twenty-two times what it would have spent on other 
alternatives to incarceration). 
ALLADINA_FINAL_2 5/6/2011  2:27:14 PM 
2011 ELECTRONIC MONITORING IN ALASKA  155 
carry out the three theories, or goals, of criminal justice has not provided 
the same assurance. Perhaps this is the reason why the Alaska Court of 
Appeals restricted the use of correctional EM in Matthew v. State225 and 
why others courts have ruled similarly.226 In order to persuade these 
courts—and particularly the Alaska Court of Appeals—that EM is 
capable of carrying out the three goals of criminal justice in an efficient 
and effective manner, it is imperative to highlight the potential EM 
would reach as part of a “hybrid” correctional scheme.227 
In Matthew, the court expressed dissatisfaction with what it 
perceived to be the lack of “institutional rules and routines” in 
correctional systems based on home confinement with EM.228 Other 
critics argue that home confinement under EM cannot punish enough,229 
cannot deter criminals from recidivating anymore than other 
alternatives,230 and cannot rehabilitate because it strips offenders of the 
social networking and rebuilding skills offered in prison.231 Any 
proposal for a hybrid scheme obviously will have to correct for these 
perceived shortcomings if it is to be implemented and widely accepted 
for use at various stages of the correctional process, and particularly the 
sentencing stage. 
Matthew (and its stringent adherence to Nygren) will pose some 
obstacles to hybrid endeavors because it emphasizes the perceived 
shortcomings of EM. But the opinion is not definitive precedent for how 
to approach EM as a judicial sanction. A court will still give credit for a 
sentence served as long as that sentence was the one an offender 
 
 225. See 152 P.3d 469 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007). 
 226. See also CROWE ET AL., supra note 136, at 24–25 (citing Fraley v. U.S. 
Bureau of Prisons, 1 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Herrera, 913 F.2d 
761 (11th Cir. 1991); Pennsylvania v. Shartle, 652 A.2d 874 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995)) 
(discussing selective cases in which courts denied credit for time served on EM). 
 227. See Payne & Gainey, supra note 34, at 431 (“[C]ommunity-based sanctions 
can be effectively used in conjunction with other traditional sanctions.”). Here 
the authors specifically suggest that applying EM directly after incarceration 
would be most effective. Id. 
 228. See 152 P.3d at 472. 
 229. See Payne & Gainey, supra note 34, at 432 (explaining that EM “is often 
misinterpreted as a slap on the wrist”). 
 230. See Fay, supra note 178, at 415 (noting that various research studies have 
found that EM offers no significant advantages in terms of reducing recidivism 
rates); cf. Gainey, Payne & O’Toole, supra note 160, at 737 (“Research findings . . . 
suggest that the effects of participation in house arrest with electronic 
monitoring are not clear-cut.”). 
 231. See Fay, supra note 178, at 409 (arguing that the strategy of substituting 
inexpensive EM for incarceration, “in its obsession with potential cost-
savings . . . ignores the value of assessment, counseling and support offered by 
experienced probation personnel”); see id. at 416 (“[R]ehabilitation is seldom a 
specific objective of electronic monitoring [programs].”). 
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received. Thus, the success of EM as a sanction will likely depend on 
other factors: whether courts will be willing to impose EM as a sentence 
in and of itself, whether the appropriate vehicles exist to carry out such a 
sanction, and whether the public will recognize it as just if it is used 
more widely.232 
Strategically pairing EM with another correctional system can win 
over critics and EM-opposed courts by combining the clear benefits of 
EM with a scheme that embodies the “institutional” elements that EM 
may lack. It is therefore crucial to choose an appropriate alternative to 
incarceration to complete the “hybrid.” The options are abundant, but 
this Note will attempt to narrow the available choices to those most 
advantageous to Alaska. 
 
A. Proposal One: Combine Electronic Monitoring with Existing      
Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Programs 
Several commentators have already recommended adding a more 
substantial treatment element to home confinement under EM.233 
Combining EM sanctions with existing therapeutic alternatives to 
incarceration would supply this “treatment” aspect. Even more 
convincing is the fact that Alaska has already successfully implemented 
therapeutic, or problem-solving, courts in several cities. The courts work 
to address a myriad of therapeutic concerns and are akin to traditional 
courts because they weigh the seriousness of a crime and then look for 
an appropriate sanction.234 They are innovative in their additional focus 
on treatment options and the likelihood that offenders will participate in 
available options and rehabilitate from that participation in ways that 
benefit both offenders and society.235 By striving “to balance the letter of 
 
 232. The author gives special thanks to Professor Lisa Kern Griffin, Duke 
University School of Law, for assistance with this paragraph. 
 233. See Fay, supra note 178, at 417 (pointing to two research studies which 
have already recognized that many of the offenders subjected to home 
confinement under EM should receive other treatment in conjunction with EM). 
 234. See Therapeutic Jurisprudence, ALASKA JUST. F., Spring 2009, at 10, 10, 
available at http://justice.uaa.alaska.edu/forum/26/1spring2009/ 
261.spring2009.pdf. 
 235. See id. Other common purposes of such courts include (1) providing 
positive outcomes for not only offenders but also victims and society as a whole; 
(2) promoting reform by responding to problems such as substance abuse or 
mental illness; (3) encouraging judicial involvement to address offenders’ 
problems; (4) encouraging collaboration with groups operating outside the 
justice system in order to improve treatment options; (5) taking on 
“unconventional” and less adversarial roles; (6) screening and assessing which 
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the law and the spirit in addressing issues of fairness to offenders and to 
victims and communities,” these problem-solving courts have 
demonstrated an ability to reduce both recidivism and incarceration 
rates.236 
Problem-solving courts’ success with respect to deterrence and 
rehabilitation237 provides compelling reason for combining therapeutic 
jurisprudence with EM. But since most of Alaska’s problem-solving 
courts concentrate on addictions or mental health issues,238 it will be 
necessary to expand the scope of the courts’ current reach (in terms of 
what issues they address). Then, especially with lower risk offenders, 
the courts could possibly prescribe sentences that involve elements of 
institution or community-driven therapy followed by home confinement 
on EM. 
A sanction involving elements of therapeutic jurisprudence 
followed by the use of EM would provide a more graduated and guided 
release to home confinement on EM and could therefore broaden the 
scope of eligible offenders. For example, higher risk offenders that may 
have been excluded from EM participation due to inappropriate 
behavior in jail or prison or severe substance abuse or mental illness239 
might find a “second chance” in this proposal. 
Then again, the extent that an offender would be eligible should 
still be weighed against the probability that the hybrid might 
successfully punish, deter, and rehabilitate him. This would vary 
according to the unique capabilities and capacities of each individual 
hybrid program. Reasonable expectations for community safety would 
also factor in, so offenders deemed highly dangerous probably would 
not meet the criteria for eligibility unless the conditions imposed by the 
hybrid advanced to accommodate such offenders. And since assessing 
these matters would require additional time and monetary investment 
on top of what would likely be an already expensive hybrid, selectively 
screening potential participants might be even more necessary with the 
hybrid than without. 
At the very least, the therapeutic justice-EM approach would help 
relieve the state’s overcrowded prisons and bolster EM’s ability to deter 
and rehabilitate offenders. But in case policymakers or other critics 
 
offenders should be referred to therapeutic courts; and (7) using screening and 
assessing tools as early as possible to identify potential candidates. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. See id. 
 238. See id. 
 239. See CROWE ET AL., supra note 136, at 36 (recommending exclusion criteria 
for EM participation, with one criterion being “severe substance abuse or mental 
illness that limits offender’s ability to control his or her behavior”). 
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argue that this hybrid lacks an appropriate degree of “retribution,” 
another option would be to impose a shorter sentence of traditional 
incarceration followed by the therapeutic justice-EM approach. 
Although this alternative might not immediately relieve jail and prison 
overcrowding, it could speed up the turnover in these facilities while 
successfully deterring and rehabilitating participants. Ultimately, no 
matter how the hybrid is implemented, it will surely require significant 
research, planning, resource redistribution, financial investment, and 
patience. 
B. Proposal Two: Combine Electronic Monitoring with Halfway 
Housing 
A halfway house, or residential community treatment center, “is a 
transitional housing facility designed to rehabilitate people who have 
recently left a prison or medical-care facility, or who otherwise need 
help in adjusting to a normal life.”240 The restrictive community-based 
environment comprises the punitive component of this sanction while 
the reintegration and transitional services offered to participants 
comprise the rehabilitative, or reintegration, component.241 Adding an 
EM element to halfway housing could reinforce the sanction’s restrictive 
and retributive aspects. This option would also appease those concerned 
with public safety. And for several of the same reasons the therapeutic 
jurisprudence-EM option allows a larger class of offenders to reap the 
benefits of EM, the community-driven reintegration offered in the 
halfway house-EM option likewise would allow many more offenders to 
benefit. 
Although halfway houses have not been shown to reduce 
recidivism any more than other alternatives to incarceration,242 
policymakers could potentially borrow from the successful 
recommendations of therapeutic courts and apply those to the halfway 
house-EM combination. In the alternative, policymakers could 
implement further restrictions on halfway houses that would more 
closely reflect the “institutional rules and routines” found in traditional 
jails or prisons. By then adding the EM element of restraint, correctional 
systems would better achieve a balance between community-driven and 
institutional-enforced retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation. 
 
 240. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 781 (9th ed. 2009). 
 241. See Klein-Saffran, supra note 162, at 24–25. 
 242. See generally Charles L. Walsh and Scott H. Beck, Predictors of Recidivism 
Among Halfway House Residents, 15 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 1066 (1990). 
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CONCLUSION 
In order to move toward the realization of EM “hybrid” efforts, 
whether based on therapeutic jurisprudence or halfway housing, Alaska 
policymakers need to encourage public understanding and generate 
wider support for EM at different stages of the criminal justice process. 
Policymakers should also recognize the feasibility of combining diverse 
sanctions, consider how different offenders respond to different 
sanctions, and remember not to overrate or underrate EM’s potential as 
an efficient and effective alternative to incarceration when part of a 
combined correctional scheme.243 These steps will allow policymakers to 
maximize the potential benefits of EM while addressing the concerns 
discussed by the Alaska Court of Appeals in Matthew v. State and cited 
by various critics. Because these concerns pinpoint a perceived lack of 
institutional structure, policymakers should first conduct an in-depth 
statistical analysis of the advantages and deficiencies of home 
confinement under EM in Alaska.244 Knowing these advantages and 
deficiencies will allow them to target the alternatives to incarceration 
that will produce the most efficient and effective “hybrid” when 
combined with EM. 
The success EM already has had as the state’s most cost-effective 
alternative to incarceration and as a viable method of reintegration 
suggests that it certainly can improve Alaska’s correctional system if 
executed strategically. While the means to this end may be costly in the 
short term, the results would allow for a more cost-effective and 
comprehensive administration of criminal justice in the long term. 
Consequently, Alaska policymakers will have to redistribute resources 
and seek out new ones in addition to planning and executing the 
substantive EM hybrid. Then, through trial and error, the state’s 
correctional department will be in a much more informed and 
experienced position to determine whether to expand the use of EM or 
continue the search for a more suitable alternative to incarceration. 
Perhaps this determination will confirm the perceived shortcomings of 
EM discussed in Matthew v. State or perhaps it will have the opposite 
effect—proving that the potential of home confinement under EM can be 
realized in Alaska. This, in turn, could affect the status of the statutes 
governing EM use in the state and could even affect the current 
interpretation and importance of Nygren v. State. For now, the state 
ought to at least engage in a close examination of what could potentially 
 
 243. See Gainey, Payne & O’Toole, supra note 160, at 749–50. 
 244. See DeMichele & Payne, supra note 23, at 34 (“[T]echnologies used to 
monitor offenders in the community have both benefits and drawbacks.”). 
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be an invaluable alternative to incarceration at all stages of the criminal 
process. 
 
